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Promise, Peril, Precaution: The Environmental
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms
STEPHEN TROMANS*
INTRODUCTION
Two statements, separated by twelve years, encapsulate the particular
concerns as to the unpredictable potential effects of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs) released into the environment. The first comes from the
United Kingdom's Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (Royal
Commission) in its 1989 Report, The Release of Genetically Engineered
Organisms to the Environment
Organisms which survive and become established could
affect the environment in a variety of ways-both
beneficial and undesirable. Some releases may alter the
diversity of species in the environment, including changing
the composition of existing communities. Such effects
could produce noticeable changes in the countryside,
locally or more widely, and could also have an economic
impact, for example if the new organisms proved to be
successful predators, competitors, parasites or pathogens of
crop plants. Such organisms could pose a threat to human
health. At the most extreme, new organisms could
conceivably affect major environmental processes such as
weather patterns, the nitrogen cycle or other regenerative
soil processes.
The second statement is contained in the recitals to the European
Community's (EC) new Directive on the deliberate release into the
environment of GMOs: "Living organisms, whether released into the
environment in large or small amounts for experimental purposes or as
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1. ROYAL COMM'N ONENVIh .POLLUTION, THIRTEENTH REPORT, 1989, Cm. 720, at 18.
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commercial products, may reproduce in the environment and cross national
frontiers thereby affecting other member states. The effects of such
releases on the environment may be irreversible."2
GMOs therefore present a new twist on the traditional dilemma of
balancing the benefits of a technology against its actual or potential adverse
environmental consequences. There is no dispute that GMOs may provide
immense benefits in terms of food production, medical treatment, and
indeed, as the basis for new and less polluting industrial processes. Yet
their behavior and characteristics in the environment, once released, cannot
readily be known. As living entities, they will multiply, adapt, evolve, and
interact in ways that traditional inanimate pollutants cannot. Once released,
they cannot be recalled, retrieved, or neutralized. The timescales over
which their effects may become apparent are large, and those effects may
not be immediately obvious. They will not respect national boundaries or
legal systems. The effectiveness of the regulatory procedures to control
such releases is therefore critical in ensuring that the worst concerns of
commentators do not come to pass. The main object of this paper is to
consider how such systems have evolved, and how effective they are likely
to prove in practice.
I. THE UNITED KINGDOM
The Royal Commission's Thirteenth Report concluded that though the
environment was "generally resilient, resistant to invasion by alien
organisms and robust to biological perturbations," it was probable that
some organisms, once released, would become established; of these the
majority were likely to pose no hazard, but others might cause varying
degrees of disturbance, which, in extreme cases, might have serious
environmental consequences.3 The Royal Commission made a series of
recommendations, based around the central concept of a statutory scheme
for controlling releases, including the screening of applications for "release
licences," the registration of companies or organizations carrying out trial
2. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC,
1990 O.J. (L 117) 15) (essentilly the same statement appears in Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1990
O.J. (L 117) 15) [hereinafter Council Directive 2001/18/EC].
3. ROYAL COMM'N ONENVrL. POLLUTON, supra note 1, at 84.
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releases, general public access to information on releases, and imposition of
strict statutory liability on those carrying out releases in breach of these
requirements.4
Prior to the Royal Commission's report, the main statutory controls had
related to the contained use of GMOs, focusing on the health and safety of
the workers involved.' However, there had been a growing awareness of
the wider environmental implications, under the scrutiny of first the Genetic
Manipulation Advisory Group (GMAG) and later the Advisory Committee
on Genetic Manipulation (ACGM). A non-statutory scheme, whereby
proposed releases were notified to ACGM for consideration, was replaced
by a statutory requirement that the releasing organization give prior notice
to the Health and Safety Executive and establish an internal risk assessment
committee.6 In addition, specific legislation regulated products comprising
or including GMOs.7 The Royal Commission was clear, however, that
fresh legislation was required to provide specifically for the control of
releases of all categories of GMOs.'
That recommendation was accepted, and the legislation was duly
introduced as Part VI of the Environmental Protection Act 1990.9 The
purpose of the scheme is stated at section 106(1) as "preventing or
minimis ing any damage to the environment which may arise from the
escape or release from human control of genetically modified organisms."' 0
At the same time, the government established the Advisory Committee on
Releases to the Environment (ACRE) to advise as a single expert
committee on both the environmental and human health risks of releases.
Part VI has been used to control deliberate release and marketing of GMOs,
their contained use being regulated under other legislation. " The essential
scheme of Part VI is to require, as a minimum, that all persons proposing to
4. Id. at 92-99.
5. See Health and Safety at Work ect. Act, 1974, c. 37 (Eng.); The Health and Safety (Genetic
Manipulation) Regulations, (1978) SI 1978/752.
6. The Genetic Manipulation Regulations, (1989) SI 1989/1810.
7. See Consumer Protection Act, 1987, c. 43 (Eng.); Food and Environment Protection Act, 1985, c.
48 (Eng.); Food Act, 1984, c. 30 (Eng.); Medicines Act, 1971, c. 69 (Eng.); Medicines Act, 1968, c. 67
(Eng.); Plant Health Act, 1967, c. 8 (Eng.).
8. ROYAL COMM'N ONENVIL. POLLUTION, supra note 1.
9. Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, pt. VI (Eng.).
10. Id. § 106(1).
11. See The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations, (2000) SI 2000/2831
(replacing The Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations, (1992) SI 1992/3217).
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import, acquire, keep, release, or market GMOs should carry out a risk
assessment of possible environmental damage resulting from those acts and
should, where prescribed, notify the Secretary of State of their intentions to
act. 2 Section 109 imposes a series of general duties on such persons to
identify the risks of damage to the environment, and to cease their activities
if it appears that, despite the precautions that could be taken, there is a risk
of damage to the environment.' 3 The Secretary of State can enforce these
duties by way of prohibition notices, 14 and the breach of these duties entails
criminal liability under section 118." ' Additionally, in prescribed
situations, these activities require a specific consent from the Secretary of
State under section 111.16 Public registers of information on consents,
notices, and other matters are required to be kept under section 122.17 In
reality, the regulations made under the regime require that express consent
be obtained in all cases, so that section 111 provides the exclusive means of
control, rather than the more minimalist, general requirements of sections
108 through 110.
As with much U.K. environmental legislation, the statute provides only
a framework, and gives relatively little guidance as to how the controls
might actually be applied. However, it is apparent from the face of the
legislation that the provision of information and risk assessment are
essential parts of the procedure.'8 The applicant for consent must provide
substantial information, including the names and qualifications of the
scientific personnel involved, a full description of the scientific properties
of the organism, a statement of all the various techniques involved, the
location of release sites, and details of all possible predators, prey, hosts,
competitors, and traits.' 9 In addition, under the regulations, any application
for consent to release a GMO must be accompanied by "a statement
12. Environmental Protection Act, supra note 9, § 108.
13. Id. § 109.
14. Id. § 110.
15. Id. § 118(lXd).
16. Id. § 111; see The Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations, (1992) SI
1992/3280, pt. II, § 5.
17. Environmental Protection Act, supra note 9, § 122.
18. See, e.g., ROYAL COMM'N ON ENVTL. POLLUTION, FOURTEENTH REPORT, 1991, Cm. 1557
(seeking to adapt the procedures known as HAZOP (hazard and operability studies) used in the
chemicals industry).
19. The Genetically Modified Organisms (Deliberate Release) Regulations, (1992) SI 1992/3280, pt.
II & sched. I.
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evaluating the impacts and risks posed to human health and the
environment by the release of the organisms." 0 Guidance issued by the
Department of Environment recommends the steps to be included in this
risk assessment, though the format of the statement is left to individual
applicants. The Secretary of State is required to act on the application
within ninety days.2 '
Applications for consent to release certain GMOs for research and
development purposes are subject to a "fast track" procedure if the GMOs
concerned are recognized by ACRE as being of low hazard, the release
conditions proposed are considered low risk, and no repetition of trials is
involved.22 The British government has a voluntary agreement with the
biotechnology industry body, Supply Chain Initiative on Modified
Agricultural Crops (SCIMAC), whereby marketing of genetically modified
crops in the United Kingdom is to be delayed until the results of farm-scale
trials are evaluated, which will not be until 2002. This allows up to 12,000
acres of genetically modified crops, including sugar beet, oilseed rape, and
fodder maize, to be grown each year in a trial program running from 2000
to 2002.
In fact, the issue of field-scale trials of GMOs in the United Kingdom
has proved immensely controversial, with arguments as to the adequacy of
"buffer zones" imposed between the GMOs and other crops, and with direct
action by environmental protestors in the form of pulling up or destroying
the modified crops.23  Such trials are necessary not only to assess
environmental risks, but also in terms of EC and U.K. law for seeds to be
listed under the Seeds (National Lists of Varieties) Regulations 198224
20. Id. pt. II, § 6(1Xc).
21. The Regulation and Control of the Deliberate Release of GMOs, DoE/ACRE Guidance Note 1.
22. Id.
23. The most widely publicized example involved the acquittal in 2000 of twenty-nine Greenpeace
protestors, including their Executive Director Lord Melchett, by a jury at Norwich Crown Court on
charges of criminal damage to genetically modified maize crops being grown on trials. Life in this case
imitated art, since a long running story line in the radio agricultural soap "The Archers" (a British
institution for decades) had involved Tommy Archer, a teenage protestor, similarly maintaining a
defense of lawful excuse in identical circumstances. An attack on oilseed rape being grown in
Oxfordshire in 1999 by 400 demonstrators was one of the largest acts of civil disobedience in recent
British history. Another attack in County Durham in 1999 led to the protestors being found guilty of
criminal damage, but given a conditional discharge on the basis that the judge accepted their honest
belief that their actions had "a positive purpose."
24. The Seeds (National List of Varieties) Regulations, (1982) SI 844/2359.
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(Regulations) to allow marketing in the United Kingdom, and admission to
the "common catalogue" of seeds allowed for marketing throughout the
EC.25  In February 2001, the Government announced a significant
expansion in the trials program, sanctioning ninety-six farm-scale trials,
twice the number approved in 2000. In particular, environmental groups
were outraged that no extension was made to the ninimum separation
distances or buffer zones from other crops, with distances set between
eighty and 100 meters, when research suggested that cross-contamination
could occur at distances of up to 4,000 meters.
The issue of direct release for marketing is dealt with separately under
the Regulations. Again, risk assessment is central, but the procedure differs
significantly from that for other releases because placing a product on the
market involves a much greater level of interaction with the European
Commission (Commission). 2 6
II. THE EC DIMENSION
At the same time as the British legislation described above was
evolving, the EC was developing measures to address the risks of GMOs, in
terms of both their contained use and their deliberate release. These
measures were implemented by Directive 90/219/EEC on the contained use
of genetically modified microorganisms 2 7 and Directive 90/220/EEC on the
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms.28
It will be noted that the contained use Directive applies only to
microorganisms. 29  The Directive was a response to the growth in
biotechnology research work during the 1970s in many member states, and
the establishment in 1985 of the Commission's Biotechnology Regulation
Interservice Committee. The Directive was based on classification of
different types of operations (basically small-scale operations for teaching,
25. Council Directive 70/457/EEC, 1970 O.J. (L 225) 1 (discussing the catalogue of varieties of
agricultural plant species) [hereinafter Council Directive 70/457/EEC].
26. See Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15 (repealed by Council Directive
2001/18/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1) [hereinafter Council Directive 90/220/EEC].
27. Council Directive 90/219/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 177) 1 (amended by Council Directive 98/81/EC,
1998 O.J. (L 330) 13).
28. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, stpra note 26.
29. Council Directive 98/81/EC, art. 2(a), 1998 O.J. (L 330) 13 (defining microorganism as any
microbiological entity capable of replication or of transferring genetic material).
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research, and other non-commercial activities on the one hand, and all other
operations on the other) and different groups of GMOs (depending on their
inherent hazard). This rather complex and inflexible system was amended
by Directive 98/81/EC to provide a less bureaucratic, more risk-based
approach.
The deliberate release Directive has proved much more controversial.
At the time it was originally published as a proposal, national policy in
member states was relatively unformed, though guidelines and regulatory
structures were beginning to be developed, in particular in Germany and
Denmark.3 ° The Directive governs both deliberate relase and marketing of
GMOs and was promoted under article 100a of the European Treat 3 ' as a
measure to harmonize provisions in member states having as their object
the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
The Directive placed a general obligation on member states to "ensure
that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human
health and the environment which might arise from the deliberate release or
placing on the market of GMOs."32  It established two systems for
notification--one for the deliberate release of GMOs for research and
development and other non-marketing purposes, and the other for placing
on the market products containing GMOs. The approach, as explained in
the Recitals to the Directive, is one of "step by step," whereby containment
is reduced and the scale of release increased gradually when the evaluation
of earlier steps indicates that the next steps can be taken.33
The system for deliberate release requires notification, including a
technical dossier and an impact and risk evaluation statement to be
submitted to the competent authority in the member state concerned.3 4 A
tight timescale then applies under which the competent authority must
30. INST. FOR EUROPEAN ENVTL. POLICY, MANUAL OF ENVL. POLICY: THE EU & BRITAIN § 7.14,
at 4 (Nigel Haigh ed., Elsevier Science 1999) (1992).
31. See Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the
European Communities and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, art. 95, O.J. (C 340) 1 (1997)
[hereinafter Treaty of Amsterdam] (article 95 was originally adopted by the Single European Act as
article 100(a)).
32. Council Directive 90/220/EEC, stipra note 26, art. 4(1).
33. Id. recitals.
34. See id. art. 5 & Annex II. This includes information on the GMO, conditions of release, receiving
environment, interactions between the GMO and the environment, monitoring, control, and emergency
plans.
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examine and evaluate the proposal and forward a summary of the
notification to the Commission, which, in turn, forwards it to other member
states, which have thirty days to request further information and to provide
comments.35 The competent authority must consider any such comments,
and must inform the notifier of the decision to approve or reject the request
for release within ninety days of the original notification.36 One problem
with this system was the relatively weak requirements for public
consultation, which simply provided that the member state could provide, if
it thought it appropriate, that particular groups or the public should be
consulted on any aspect of the proposed release.
37
The procedures for placing products containing GMOs on the market
are more rigorous. The manufacturer or importer must submit a notification
to the competent authority when the product is to be placed on the market
for the first time.38  This must be accompanied by a technical dossier, risk
assessment for the environment and human health, details of conditions for
use and handling, and proposals as to labeling and packaging (which must
meet the requirements of Annex III).' 9 The competent authority must either
reject the application within ninety days or send the dossier to the
Commission with a favorable opinion. 40  The Commission forwards the
dossier to other member states, which have sixty days to raise objections. 41
If no objections are received, the competent authority is to give its consent
within sixty days.42 If there are unresolved objections, the decision is taken
by the Commission, in consultation with an expert advisory committee set
up under the Directive and composed of national representatives chaired by
a Commission representative 3.4  The Chairman submits a proposal on which
35. Id. arts. 6, 9.
36. Id. art 6(2).
37. Id. art. 7.
38. Id. art. 1 l(1).
39. Id. Annex III requires the identification of potentially harmful effects associated with the GMO,
the vector and any inserted genet ic material. Such harmful effects are defined to include human, animal,
or plant diseases, resistance to treatments or prophylactics for disease, and deleterious effects due to
establishment or dissemination in the environment, or to the natural transfer of inserted genetic material
to other organisms. The severity and the likelihood of those potentially harmful events being realized
should then be assessed.
40. Id. art. 12(2).
41. Id. art. 13(2).
42. Id.
43. Id. arts. 13(3), 21.
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the Committee delivers its opinion by a weighted majority: the measure is
adopted if agreed to by the Committee and the Chairman; otherwise, the
matter goes to the European Council (Council) for a decision on a qualified
majority basis.44 Once consent has been given, the product may be used
throughout the EC provided that any conditions of the consent are strictly
complied with, and member states may not prohibit, restrict or impede such
use.45  There is, however, a procedure of limited scope but high political
significance, which allows a member state, with justifiable reasons to
consider that the notified product constitutes a risk to human health or to
the environment, provisionally to restrict or prohibit its use or sale in its
territory.46 The Commission must be notified, and a decision made as to the
GMOs continued marketing within three months, under the article 21
Committee procedure., 
7
During the 1990s, the Directive was subject to some fine-tuning in
terms of its procedures, the information required with notification, and the
introduction in 1997 of compulsory labeling of products containing
GMOs.41 However, in 1996, the Commission published a review of the
Directive after consultation with competent authorities, environmental and
other interest groups, and industry. This led to the adoption in 1997 of a
proposal to amend the Directive,49 which, in turn, opened a highly
controversial debate. The proposal for amendment contemplated a much
stricter regime, including more rigorous scientific consultation
requirements, fixed-term consents, compulsory monioring of
environmental impact after the product was placed on the market, and the
possibility for the Council to refuse approval of a product by simple
majority.50 The European Parliament was not satisfied, however, and in
44. Id. art. 21; Treaty of Amsterdam, supra note 31, art. 205 (article 205 was originally adopted by
the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrIY as article 148). If the Council fails
to act within three months of the referral, the Commission will adopt the measures. Council Directive
90/220/EEC, supra note 26, art. 21.
45. Council Directive 70/457/EEC, sigra note 25, arts. 13(5), 15.
46. Id. art. 16(1).
47. Id. art. 16(2).
48. See Commission Directive 97/35/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 169) 72; Commission Decision 94/730/EC,
1994 O.J. (L 292) 31; Commission Directive 94/15/EC, 1994 O.J. (L 103) 20; Commission Decision
92/146/EEC, 1992 O.J. (L 60) 19; Council Decision 91/596/EEC, 1991 O.J. (L 322) 1.
49. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive Amending Directive 90/220/EEC on
the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms, COM(98)85 final.
50. Id.
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February 1999 adopted 101 amendments to the proposal. These included
the imposition of strict liability on those releasing GMOs for harm to
human health or the environment, extension of the requirements for
environmental risk assessment, stricter rules on labeling, and a ban on the
inclision of antibiotic -resistant genes or traces of toxic substances in
GMOs. In addition, the Environment Committee of the Parliament argued
for a moratorium on all new market releases of GMOs pending revision of
the Directive. The Council, however, felt there was no legal basis for such
a moratorium.
There then followed two intertwined processes: first, the formal
procedures for agreement on the new Directive, and second, political
maneuvering as to the conditions for dealing with new applications. The
formal process was protracted, both because of the dispute as to the
demands of the European Parliament for tougher legislation and because of
the need to take into account the development and implementation of the
Biosafety Protocol, agreed to in Montreal in January 2000 and adopted on
behalf of the EC in May 2000.
At the same time, pressure was maintained for a European Union (EU)-
wide moratorium. Following the Environment Council meeting in June
1999, a legal moratorium was rejected, essentially because of concerns as to
its legality and the possibility of legal action by the United States under the
World Trade Organization (WTO). However, two separate formal
reservations were made, one a "Declaration of Suspension" by France,
Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg, and the second, a weaker version
by Germany, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Finland, and the Netherlands. The
latter countries called for the introduction of more stringent rules and
indicated that, in the meantime, on the basis of the precautionary principle,
they would authorize no further releases. In practice, this amounted to a de
facto moratorium. At that point, some fourteen applications for consent
were pending.
In the case of three products pending approval, the biotechnology
companies concerned agreed to comply in advance with the stricter rules
likely to be introduced under the new Directive. In an attempt to improve
this unsatisfactory situation, the Commission produced, in July 1999 a new
strategy for accelerated adoption of the new rules, once they were agreed,
as well as labeling and traceability procedures. However, the French
Presidency of the Council organized an informal meeting of ministers in
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July 2000, at which it was agreed that all new GMO approvals for the EU
market would be postponed.
Particular attention has centered on the licensing of genetically
modified maize for sale in the EU.5' In December 1996, the Commission
decided to authorize its marketing, in the face of outraged opposition by
thirteen member states. The maize (Bt maize) was genetically engineered
by Novartis to be resistant to an herbicide and toxic to a pest (the European
corn-borer); in addition, it contained a marker gene making it resistant to an
antibiotic (ampicillin). One concern was that if the maize was not
processed before use in animal feed, the antibiotic resistance could be
transferred to bacteria. Under the comitology procedure of Directive
90/220, the Council of Ministers could only reject the proposal by
unanimous vote, which was impossible because France supported the
application as the competent authority to which it had been made.
Following informal advice from the three EU scientific committees (on
Food, Animal Nutrition, and Pesticides) the Commission authorized the
placing of the genetically modified maize on the market.52 It has since been
grown commercially in Spain and, on a smaller scale, in France and
Portugal.
Two countries, Austria and Luxembourg, introduced ministerial decrees
banning the use of the genetically modified maize, relying on article 16 of
the Directive. The Commission, having consulted the three scientific
committees, determined that these bans were not justified under the terms
of article 16. However, there was opposition to the Commission taking
action to force Austria and Luxembourg to lift the bans, and they remained
in place. At the same time, interest groups including Friends of the Earth
and Greenpeace took legal action in France to challenge .the marketing of
the maize on the basis that it contravened the precautionary principle. The
French Conseil d'Etat suspended the approval in September 1998 and
referred the matter to the European Court of Justice.53
Work published by U.S. scientists in May 1999 suggested that pollen
from insect-resistant genetically modified maize of the Bt Novartis variety
51. See generally INST. FOR EUR ENVFL. POLICY, supra note 30, § 7.14, at 10-12 (explaining in
detail the dispute over licensing of genetically modified maize).
52. Commission Decision 97/98/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 31) 69.
53. See Case C-6/99, Ass'n Greenpeace France & Others v. Ministrre de 'Agriculture et de la Peche
& Others (decision of the European court of Justice).
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killed almost half of the Monarch butterflies exposed to it in laboratory
conditions. This led to the Commission freezing the authorization process
for a similar genetically modified maize variety produced by Pioneer-Hi-
Bred. However, in October 1999 the EU's scientific advisers concluded
that this evidence did not "constitute new significant information"
warranting reassessment of Bt maize. This was met by public uproar and
demands by environmental groups for authorizations for Bt maize to be
withdrawn.
Further concern arose in December 1999 in response to findings from
Cornell University that insect-killing toxins from Bt maize could leach into
soil and persist there for weeks, with the ability to kill larvae after twenty-
five days. As well as killing the intended pests, the concern was that the
toxin could also kill benign organisms and affect soil ecology. As a result
of these concerns, Germany took steps in February 2000 to prevent
marketing and large-scale growing of Bt maize, relying on article 16 of the
Directive.
In February 2001, the revised Directive-described by the British
Labour MEP and European Parliament Rapporteur as "the tightest GM laws
in the world" 54-was finally approved and will replace Directive 90/220/EC
as of October 17, 2002. However, this is not the end of the debate. The
Commission has announced its intention to lift the moratorium, but five
member states, led by France, insisted that it must remain in place.
The stated objectives of the new Directive 2001/18/EC remain the same
as for 90/220/EEC, save for the insertion of an express reference to the
precautionary principle.55 The general obligations of member states and the
Commission are spelled out more fully, in terms of accurate assessment of
direct or indirect potential adverse effects being required on a case-by-case
basis,56 and in a requirement to ensure traceability of marketed GMOs.
5 7
There is a new provision dealing with how modifications or unintended
54. Martin Fletcher, French Threaten to Thwart Deal on GM Crops, LONDON TIMES Feb. 12,2001,
at 14.
55. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 2, arts. 1, 4(1).
56. Id. art. 4. Specific reference is also made to the assessment of risk from antibiotic resistance
markers in GMOs, with a view to their phase-out by the end of 2004 for Part C releases and 2008 for
Part B releases.
57. Id. art. 4(6).
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changes to releases, or new information on risks, are to be handled.5" The
inadequate provision of public consultation is replaced by a firm
requirement to consult the public and, where appropriate, groups, on
proposed deliberate releases.59 The procedures for consent to marketing
GMOs have been substantially overhauled, with a maximum duration of ten
years for any consent6° and specific provisions as to renewal of consent.61
When there are objections to marketing from another member state, the
procedures are spelled out much more clearly in the amended Directive
than in the original Directive.62 Where consent is given, there are now
firmer labeling requirements, including a requirement that the words "[t]his
product contains genetically modified organisms" shall appear either on a
label or on a document accompanying the product. 63 There are clearer
provisions on making information available to the public 64 and on the
exchange of information and reporting. 6' There is an express invitation to
the Commission to bring forward as soon as possible-and in any event
before July 2001-a proposal for implementing in detail the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety to complement, and if necessary amend, the
provisions of the Directive.66
Despite these significant improvements to the EC system of control, six
countries,67 led by France, issued a Statement noting that these
improvements were only partial, seeking early new legislation on
traceability and labeling and on environmental liability, and reaffirming
their intention, when exercising the powers conferred upon them, of
ensuring that new authorizations for cultivating and marketing GMOs be
suspended "pending the adoption of effective provisions concerning
complete traceability of GMOs that guarantees reliable labelling of all
GMO products." Given that the new Directive contains a national
"safeguard clause" allowing for provisional restrictions, broadly similar to
58. Id. art. 8.
59. Id. art. 9.
60. Council Directive 2001/18/EC, supra note 2, art. 15(4).
61. Id. art. 17.
62. Id. arts. 18, 28-30.
63. Id. arts. 19(3)(e), 21.
64. Id. art. 24.
65. Id. art. 31.
66. Id. art. 32(1).
67. Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, and Luxembourg.
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article 16 of the original Directive, it can be anticipated that such clause
will be the means used to that end.68
III. THE COURTS AND THE GMO DEBATE
Few cases have as yet come before the courts in the United Kingdom
and Europe on the control of and liability for GMOs. The leading decision
in the United Kingdom is R v. Secretary of State for Environment and
Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Food, ex parte Watson.69 Mr.
Watson was an organic farmer who grew vegetables, including sweet
com. 70 He feared that genetically modified maize being grown for trials on
an adjacent farm would cross-pollinate with his crops, threatening his
accredited status as an organic farmer with the Soil Association of Great
Britain.7' Trials in the United Kingdom were required to satisfy the
requirements of the regulations as to the value for cultivation and use of the
seeds.72 Consent for the release of the genetically modified maize for trials
had been given under section 111 of the Environmental Protection Act
1990. 71 Watson's solicitors wrote to the Ministers asking that the trial not
be commenced.74 His sweet corn crop was some two kilometers from the
trial site, and ACRE advised the Ministers that at such a distance the risk of
cross-pollination was likely to be zero.75 On that basis, the Ministers
refused to revoke or vary the consent.76 Watson challenged that decision
for various reasons. The first basis of challenge was that the Ministers had
acted irrationally in relying on the ACRE advice. It was argued that
assessment of the risk at "zero" was too narrow an approach, which did not
adequately assess the degree of the risk or address the disastrous
consequences for Watson's business if the risk were to eventuate.
77
68. Council Directive 2001/18/EC supra note 2, art. 23; see also Council Directive 70/457/EEC,
supra note 25, art. 16.
69. ExparteWatson, Env. L.R. 310 (C.A., 1999).
70. Id. at 312.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 313.
73. See Environmental Protection Act, 1990, c. 43, pt. VI, § 111 (Eng.); see also Watson, supra note
69, at 313-14.
74. Watson, supra note 69, at 315.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
PROMISE, PERIL, PRECAUTION
Looking at the basis on which ACRE had given this advice, the Watson
Court concluded that it constituted "a reasonably confident assessment that
realistically there is no more than minimal risk":
Of course, this falls short of the guarantee that the applicant
and Friends of the Earth were looking for. But it seems to
me a perfectly reasonable point at which to strike the
balance between the competing interests in play. Whether
events prove the assessment to have been too sanguine
remains to be seen. That, however, as all parties before us
recognize, is not a matter for this Court.
78
Challenges were made on other bases, unsuccessfully, as to the scope of the
consent in terms of who could actually undertake the trials and as to
procedural irregularities under the Regulations.79
The first judgment of the European Court of Justice concerning the
Deliberate Release Directive was Association Greenpeace France v.
Ministere de 1'Agriculture et de la Peche. ° This was a challenge to the
decision of the French Ministry to authorize herbicide-tolerant genetically
modified maize that had gone through the EC procedures successfully
following objections by other member states. As explained above, article
13 of the Directive requires the national competent authority to give its
consent in writing, which the French government did by way of decree.
Greenpeace sought to identify procedural defects in the earlier national
stages of the procedure, before the French dossier had been sent to the
Commission. The European Court rejected the arguments of Greenpeace
that there was a residual discretion to withhold consent under article 13
once a favorable decision had been given at EC level. Greenpeace had
relied particularly in this context on the precautionary principle, a line of
argument to which the European Court has increasingly been receptive.
But in this case, the Court held that the precautionary principle was
satisfied by the structure of the Directive as a whole, including the
78. Id. at 316.
79. Id. at 316-23. It was found that there were indeed procedural defects, but these did not go to the
issue of environmental risk to Watson's crops, and so did not entitle him to relief. Id.
80. See Case C-6/99, Ass'n Greenpeace France & Others v. Minist~re de l'Agriculture et de la Peche
& Others.
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obligation on the notifier under article 11 to draw the attention of the
competent authority to any new information on risks, and the powers of
member states to take provisional measures under article 16. On the issue
of procedural defects, the European Court held that when they (as here)
were alleged to affect the validity of a Community measure, it was a matter
for the European Court rather than national courts.
IV. CONCLUSION: POLITICS, RISK, AND PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE
There is no doubt that politicians in Europe fear the GMO debate, and
with good reason. There are high levels of public mistrust and a general
lack of acceptance of the new technology.8 The Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom, Tony Blair, has suffered damage from accusations that
his government has been over-influenced by the multinational interests
concerned. In France, a political wedge has been driven between the
Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, and the President, Jacques Chirac,
over the issue. As explained above, faced with legally tenuous use of
article 16 provisional restriction procedures by Member States, the
European Commission has not directly challenged practice under article 16,
but has instead focused on administrative procedures.
As will be appreciated from the account above, the EC procedures are
complex and are a product of political compromise. Concern over
decisions taken on a "comitology" basis is not confined to the GMO debate,
and extends to many other areas of health and environmental risk
assessment.8 2  The EC procedures must deal with the paradox of the
denationalization of risk issues, set against the growing importance of
national interests and national perceptions on risk, while at the same time
having to take decisions which are defensible in international fora, such as
the WTO. This involves a search for legitimacy in the EC's decisions,
backed by greater participation by stakeholders.83  The current
81. This is made worse by scandals over Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) and over food in
Belgium contaminated by dioxins.
82. See ELLEN VOS, INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS OF COMMUNITY HEALTH AND SAFETY
LEGISLATION: COMMITTEEs, AGENCIES, ANDP RIVATE BODIES 110-82 (1999).
83. It is noteworthy that a lack of public information, consultation, and transparency were generally
seen as the key defects in the handling of the BSE/nvCJD crisis in the United Kingdom between 1986
and 1988. See I LORDPHILLIPS OF WORTH MATRAVERS ETAL, THE BSE INQUIRY 34-35 (2000).
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shortcomings relate principally to such issues, and especially to the lack of
a coherent concept of risk regulation within the EC.84
On the broader global political scale, there must also be a search for
harmonized procedures and accepted risk assessment criteria, for example
as between the European Commission and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration and Department of Agriculture. While the United States is
currently perceived within Europe as having taken a less strident approach
to GMOs, with fewer threats of complaint to the WTO, and a significant
softening of free trade rhetoric, the international debate is most certainly not
over. The United States will no doubt be concerned that European
antipathy to GMOs could easily spread to North America, as witness the
protests at the Seattle WTO meeting. Moreover, profits will not be made
from GMOs if consumers are simply unwilling to buy them. 85 Demand for
GMO-free products has soared in Europe, Japan, and some Pacific Rim
countries, leading to demand for guaranteed non-genetically modified
supplies. In response to such concerns, U.S. producers have been reported
as increasingly tending to segregate genetically modified crops.
The focus of public concern has so far been on possible human health
effects from foodstuffs containing GMOs (as witness the "Frankenstein
foods" tag used by the British tabloid press on the occasions when the story
has surfaced). However, it is perhaps the wider environmental concerns
that are less well understood and more worrying. It was the possible
indirect and cumulative effects of GMO use that concerned the House of
Lords Select Committee on the European Communities when it considered
the proposed reform of Directive 90/220/EEC in 1998.86 Similarly, the
84. The European jurisprudence on the use of the precautionary principle has leaned generally in
favor of a precautionary approach and of judicial deference to the exercise of legislative or
administrative discretion in this area. See Case C- 180/96R, United Kingdom v. Commission of the
European Communities, 3 C.M.L.R. 1 (1996) (British BSE Case); Case T- 13/99R, Pfizer Animal Health
SA/NV v. Council of the European Union, 3 C.M.L.R. 79 (1999) (Virginiamycin additives in
feedstuffs); Case C-437/98, Kemikalieinspektionen v. Toolex Alpha AB, E.C.R. (2000)
(trichloroethene).
85. A report by Deutsche Bank referred to GMOs as good science bat disastrously perceived,
suggesting that agricultural biotechnology companies were dubious investments, and that increasingly
GMOs were becoming a liability to farmers. See DEUTSCHE BANK, AG BIOTECH: THANKs, BUT NO
THANKS?, http://www.biotech-info.netDeutsche.html (last modified Sept. 9, 1999).
86. SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES OF THE HOUSE OF LORDS, EC REG. OF
GENETIC MODIFICATION IN AGRIC., SECOND REP., Session 1998-99, http://www.parliament.the-
stationery -office.co.uk.
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Advisory Committee on Releases to the Environment, in issued guidelines
on risk reduction from gene flow in October 2000, stressed that more could
be done to reduce the risk of indirect effects from genetically modified
crops, in particular through the use of technologies such as engineered
sterility and gene activation, and the minimization of DNA addition (for
example in marker genes).87 The Department of Environment in October
2000 issued a guidance document on assessing the risks posed by the
cultivation of GMO crops to wider biodiversity. 88 What is required appears
to be a more inclusive and holistic approach, in terms of both the process
and the content of the debate. The United Kingdom has recently created a
new body, the Agriculture and Environment Biotechnology Commission,
with the mandate of advising on "all other aspects of biotechnology except
food" and on "ethial considerations regarding the acceptability of genetic
modification.' 89 The deep philosophical differences on the issue are
epitomized by the membership of the Commission, which contains both
pro-GMO members and GMO skeptics. Whether the Commission will
succeed in engaging the public on the issues remains to be seen: the
resources available to it may be a constraint.90 The revised Directive on
deliberate release will, as discussed above, require greater openness and
engagement with the public in consultation. The Government is beginning
to grapple with the appropriate mechanisms. 9'
87. See Michael Le Page, Make Them Safe: Genetically Modified Crops Are Riskier than They
Should Be, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 28,2000, at 4.
88. DEP'T FOR ENV'T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, GUIDANCE ON THEASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT ON
WIDER BIODIVERSITY FROM PROPOSED CULTIVATION OF GM CROPS (July 31, 2001),
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environmentlacre/biodiversity/guidance/01 .htm.
89. The AEBC was formed as a result of the British Government's review of the advisory and
regulatory framework for biotechnology. CABINET OFFICE, OFFICE OFSCI. & TECH., THE ADVISORY&
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR BIOTECH.: REPORT FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S REVIEW, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (May 1999), http://www.dti.gov.uk/ost/rmay99/bioreprt.pdf.
90. The AEBC's first major piece of work has been its report on farm scale evaluations of GMO
crops, published in September 2001. See AGRIC. ENV'T & BIOTECH. COMM'N, CROPS ON TRIAL: A
REPORT BY THE AEBC (2001), http://www.aebc.gov.uk/aebc/publications/crops.pdf. The whole thrust
of that report, which is in places critical of the previous processes used for such trials, is that a much
more open and inclusive process of decisionmaking as to the future commercial growing of such crops
must be developed, with comprehensive public discussion of the ecological and ethical--including
socioeconomic-issues.
91. See DEP'T FOR ENVT, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, A CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE 2001/18/EC ON THE DELIBERATE RELEASE INTO THE ENV'T OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS (July 2001), http://www.defra.gov.uk/environmert/consult/ec-
gmo/pdf/EC-GMO.pdf.
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The genetically modified industry is itself acutely aware of the need to
engage more positively in the public dialogue.92 However, in the final
analysis, there is no escaping the fact that genetic engineering is a new and
inherently uncertain technology. As one commentator has suggested,
"engineering" is altogether too precise an approach to be acceptable as an
analogy: "Engineers (at least when operating in well-worked fields!) are
precise. They achieve exactly what they intend, entirely predictably....
Genetic engineers at best are like gardeners, who plant a seed and must then
stand back and let nature take its course."9' 3
The challenge for policymakers, legislators, and regulators is to allow
progress at an acceptable pace in terms not only of risk assessment, but also
of public and ethical acceptance. The public sees some technologies as
"convivial," 94 which, in turn, depends not only on their utility, but also on
the perceived nature of risks involved, and the ethos of how they are used.
GMOs do not at this point fall into the category of perceived "convivial"
technology, at least in Europe.
92. See GM CROPS: UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES (2001) (published with the support of the U.K.
Agricultural Biotechnology Industry) (covering issues such as separation distances, genetic purity,
herbicide tolerant crops, gene flow, food safety, and the regulation process).
93. COLIN TUDGE, THE ENGINEER IN THE GARDEN: GENES AND GENETICS: FROM THE IDEA OF
HEREDITY TO THECREATIONOF LIFE346 (Hill & Wang, 1993) (1993).
94. Id. at 349.
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